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UNION WITH GOD: A THEORY
Robert Oakes

The experience of "union with God," i.e., experience the phenomenological
core of which can be expressed as dissolution-of-self-in-God, arguably constitutes the most spiritually significant sort of religious experience. However,
it is well-known that canonical theistic metaphysics-by virtue of its (antipantheistic) insistence upon an unbridgeable bifurcation between Creator and
creature-rules out the literal veridicality of such experience. Alternatively,
whatever the phenomenological significance of "unitive" religious experience, traditional theism must deny that there can occur literal or ontological
mergings of finite selves with God. Our purpose is to construct the rudiments
of a theory designed to establish that classical theism is perfectly compatible
with the view that "unitive" religious experience has serious ontological
import; moreover, our proposal has the "practical" advantage of accounting
well for the profound conviction among the phenomenological subjects of
such experience of having "become one" with God.

The long-standing question of how (let alone whether) putative apprehensions
of God's presence can justifiably be regarded as veridical by their phenomenological subjects arguably constitutes the preeminent and most vexatious
item on the agenda of the epistemology of theistic religious experience.
Elsewhere) I attempted to establish the spuriousness-or unacceptably tendentious character-of the prevalent rejection of the thesis that there can
occur veridical experience of God's presence with the epistemic distinction
of authenticating itself to its phenomenological SUbjects. Specifically, my
purpose was to establish that we are well within our intellectual rights to
regard the idea of self-authenticating religious experience, whatever other
objections it might plausibly be heir to (e.g., its epistemic eccentricity), as
conceptually acceptable.
However, it is clear that there are other serious issues confronting the
epistemologist of theistic 'mysticism,' and, in what follows, our attention will
focus on one of them. Specifically, we will explore and attempt to ameliorate
the difficulty that has traditionally been held to block the legitimacy of
viewing as veridical any cases of what might plausibly be regarded as the
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most spiritually profound sort of religious experience: namely, the experience
of union with God.
I

To begin with, while it would be hyperbolic to suggest that the phenomenological core of all experience of 'oneness' or 'spiritual unification' with
God consists in the obliteration of self, it seems fair to claim that the dominant
or most pervasive 'unitive' state reported by theistic mystics has as its distinguishing phenomenological feature dissolution-of-self-in-God. 2 (In what
follows, I shall use 'dsGe' for the awkwardly lengthy 'dissolution-of-self-inGod experience'). Accordingly, what is tellingly central to dsGe is the sense
of merging with God to the extent that the relevant finite self as a distinct
locus of consciousness is annihilated. On the assumption that philosophers
interested in the present topic are familiar with the tradition of 'unitive'
mysticism, it would clearly be gratuitous to engage in extensive citation from
its many representatives. Rather, I suggest that more than ample backdrop
for what is to follow is provided by brief reference to the distinguished
Flemish mystic Jan van Ruysbroeck and the reproduction of a few passages
from our contemporary, Thomas Merton. It seems to me that the passages
from Merton constitute conspicuously paradigmatic and especially lyrical
descriptions of dsGe.
In Chapter XII of The Book of Supreme Truth (,Of the Highest Union,
Without Difference or Distinction '), Ruysbroeck characterizes the 'union
without distinction' as one in which 'all uplifted spirits are melted and
noughted in the Essence of God.' Merton appears to lend serious endorsement
to this characterization:
... where contemplation becomes what it is really meant to be, it is no longer
something infused by God into a created subject, so much as God living in
God and identifying a created life with His own life so that there is nothing
left of any significance but God living in God. 3

Alternatively,
Here is a man who is dead and buried and gone ... So it is with one who has
vanished into God by pure contemplation. God alone is left.4

Accordingly,
As long as there is an T that is the definite subject of a contemplative
experience, an I that is aware of itself and of its contemplation ... we have not
yet passed over the Red Sea ... s

Hence it can properly be inferred that for any veridical case of dsGe (if such
there can be-more immediately to follow on this), what would happen to
the relevant finite self would be remarkably similar to what happens to sugar
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when placed in hot water, or to gold when placed in aqua regia: i.e., 'unitive'
mysticism gives compelling indication of entailing that finite selves are-in
a perfectly straightforward sense-God-soluble. That is, given the requisite
conditions (about which more later on), finite selves dissolve into God, or,
as it is often expressed, are absorbed into God. 6
As has long been recognized, there is a clear sense in which the tenets of
canonical theism preclude the occurrence of literally veridical cases of dsGe.
For it is nonnegotiably central to theistic orthodoxy that, no matter how
intimate or close an association one may manage to develop with God, there
obtains an unbridgeable metaphysical gulf between Creator and creature, and,
accordingly, between Infinite Self and finite selves. Hence, while the doctrine
of 'unitive' or 'absorptive' mysticism is conceptually harmonious with the
largely monistic or nontheistic metaphysics of Eastern belief-systems such
as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism, it seems unimpeachable that classical
Western monotheism cannot but preclude the literal dissolution of finite
selves in God to the extent that 'God alone is left.' Rather, since any such
view patently entails (the pantheistic heterodoxy) that the unbridgeable metaphysical chasm between God and creature can completely be traversed, i.e.,
that creatures can literally merge with their Creator, it cannot but collide with
a central component of normative Judeo-Christian theism.'
As a somewhat ancillary, but, I suggest, worthwhile observation in this
regard, it seems eminently difficult to deny that, quite independently of theistic metaphysics, there is something conceptually odd about the notion that
persons can be in the epistemic position of detecting the nonexistence of
themselves as distinct centers of consciousness. Consider: while there
could-for all we know-occur ontological/literal dissolution-of-self in some
all-encompassing 'Absolute' (as held, for example, in monistic or Vedantic
Hinduism), it seems clear that no such event could ever be experienced by
the relevant finite selves. Surely, for any finite self S, the state of affairs
consisting in the nonexistence of S (qua distinct center of consciousness) is
not a state of affairs the obtaining of which is detectable by S, since such
entails that S can have (per impossible) a veridical experience of the nonexistence of that whose existence constitutes a conceptually necessary condition
for S's having any experiences at all. This is not to deny that one could
veridic ally experience himself/herself as 'contracting' or 'diminishing' as a
distinct existent (whatever such 'experience' might come to) with the profound sense that this occurrence in some way reflects God's will. Such,
however, is radically different from the contention that one can veridically
experience himself/herself as no longer existing as a distinct center of consciousness. Accordingly, the idea that there can occur literally veridical cases
of dsGe is not only inconsistent with traditional theistic metaphysics, but
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gives compelling indication of being self-inconsistent as well. Needless to
say that this amounts to powerful justification for rejecting it.
II

Shall we accede, then, to the long-standing and prevailing view that one
cannot properly or with consistency both subscribe to traditional theistic
metaphysics and maintain that the experiences of unitive or absorptive mystics can have significant ontological import? It seems to me that we would
do well to resist any temptation to do so. In what follows, we will proffer the
rudiments of a theory designed to establish that, notwithstanding the preclusion by canonical theism of literally veridical cases of dsGe, such experience
can have major metaphysical import, i.e., can without in any way compromising the inviolability of the Creator-creature bifurcation so central to canonical theism, properly be held to mark a significant sort of ontological
union between the relevant finite selves and God.
To begin with, it seems incontestable that, necessarily, experiential knowing8 -i.e., cognition that is perceptual in character-incorporates an element
of receptivity or passivity. While there is much on which epistemologists of
perception continue to disagree concerning the precise nature of that process
by which persons come to acquire 'empirical knowledge,' it seems intuitively
evident that part of what it is to have an experience (and I place strong
emphasis upon the word 'part') is to be-presented-to in some way or other. 9
Let it be clear that this is in no way intended to diminish the significance of
the conceptual, classificatory, or ordering role of mind in the experiential
process. Rather, it is simply to observe that, notwithstanding the interpretive,
i.e., property-ascribing, role of mind in making our experience fully intelligible to us, nothing could count as a case of perceptual knowing if it failed
to involve an element which, in the still telling formulation of C. I. Lewis,
'we do not create by thinking and cannot, in general, displace or alter.10 Of
course a number of epistemologists have argued that sensory presentations
have no determinate phenomenological content independently of being conceptualized in some way by their epistemic subjects. While it seems to me
that there are compelling arguments against this view,! 1 the point to be
stressed is that nothing in our thesis necessitates a quarrel with it. Accordingly, I am perfectly prepared to allow (what I am convinced is mistaken)
that sensory presentations cannot be at all intelligible to their epistemic
subjects independently of conceptualization.
Moreover, it should also be clear that nothing in the foregoing entails the
traditional doctrine-with which it has all too often been conflated or associated-that 'privileged representations' constitute the roots of our empirical
noetic structure. 12 Alternatively, nothing in our preceding discussion commits
us to any version of the view that empirical knowledge rests upon epistemi-
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cally privileged apprehensions, and, indeed, it is easy to see why. As just
noted, that perceptual cognition is partially receptive or passive in character
in no way entails that there can be unconceptualized sensory presentations
with determinate phenomenological content. Hence, that perceptual cognition
is partially receptive or passive is perfectly compatible with the view that no
intelligible sensory presentations could fail to be unconceptualized. But
where there is conceptualization, there is (of course) property-ascription and
belief. Hence, nothing that has been urged thus far precludes its being the
case that our awareness of what is 'presented' to us in the course of perceptual
cognition involves inference; however, if inference is requisite for the acquisition of empirical knowledge, the possibility of error cannot be ruled out.
Accordingly, our preceding observations are perfectly compatible with the
thesis that no intelligible perceptual apprehensions are ever epistemically
privileged or incorrigible in character.

III
Given the soundness of the foregoing, there seems to be excellent justification for adopting-albeit with the important qualification specified
below-the time-honored epistemic bifurcation formulated by Aristotle and
subscribed to by, among many other distinguished philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition, Maimonides and St. Thomas: namely, the distinction between 'active intellect' and 'passive intellect.' Now the important
qualification alluded to above is that our adoption of this traditional division
in no way commits us to a 'faculty' rather than a 'modal' psychology; rather,
our use of the adjectives 'active' and 'passive' is intended to designate aspects of intellect rather than kinds of intellect. Accordingly, our use of 'passive intellect' in the sequel constitutes a shorthand for 'the purely receptive
or being-presented-to aspect of perceptual cognition.'
Now it seems clear that the passive intellect is, roughly, the psychological/epistemic analogue of Plato's Receptacle. Just as the latter, by virtue of
its inherent formlessness, is suited to take on or receive (the exemplifications
of) 'all forms,' so the passive intellect, by virtue of its inherent formlessness,
i.e., its status as a pure epistemic-potentiality (to be perfectly Aristotelian
about it) is perfectly suited to take on or receive-is absolutely open to-an
indefinite number of phenomenological configurations. Since, once again like
Plato's Receptacle, the passive intellect lacks any positive character, there is
no self-consistent arrangement of phenomenological properties with which it
is incompatible. Following tradition-not out of any special deference to its
formulations but because I find it very difficult to improve upon tradition in
this regard-let us say that the phenomenological content which we simply
receive in the course of perceptual cognition (whether or not any feature of
such content is discriminable by us independently of conceptualization) con-
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stitutes the actualization of the passive intellect. Hence, the passive intellect,
as a purely receptive capacity, becomes literally or numerically identical to,
i.e., simply becomes, for whatever duration is involved, the phenomenological content that constitutes its actualization for that span of time. Alternatively, the phenomenological configuration that constitutes its actualization
for some given duration just is the entire nature of the passive intellect for
that duration. Accordingly, for any possible phenomenological configuration
PC, the inherent phenomenological neutrality of the passive intellect ensures
its capacity to become PC.
Now, of course, lest we countenance a crude corpuscular account of perception, passive intellects cannot become numerically identical to the material
objects an-sich that we apprehend in the course of normal perceptual cognition. That is, while it might be tempting to claim that, in cases of veridical
perception, there obtains 'an identity' between the phenomenological content
that constitutes the actualization of the passive intellects of the relevant perceivers and the objects of their perceptual cognition, it seems clear that the
'identity' in question must be qualitative rather than numerical. Aristotle conveys this point with special crispness in Book III of De Anima (424a)Y
By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible
forms of things without the matter ... The way in which a piece of wax takes
on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold ...
Accordingly, veridical perception of physical objects implies a (or something
close to a) qualitative rather than numerical identity between that which the
passive intellect becomes and the physical ding-an-sich. As pointed out by
W. D. Ross in his exposition of Aristotle on this point,
The sensitive faculty becomes its objects in the sense that their form is
conveyed over to the sensitive subject and becomes the whole nature, for the
time being, of the sensitive subject ... 14
Moreover, Aristotle insists just a bit further on (431 b) that it is impossible
that 'the things themselves' -in contradistinction to 'their forms' -be 'present in the soul. •
Aristotle's observations in this regard have, or so it seems to me, an air of
unimpeachability.15 When, for example, someone has veridical awareness of
her car, her passive intellect does not (cannot) literally become the car-ansich. Rather, and notwithstanding that attempts to provide a convincing rigorous definition of 'veridical perception' may well border on the quixotic,
this much seems incontestable: veridicality involves a qualitative approximation (if not identity) between some perceiver's phenomenological content and
the (surface of the) material object that (partially) explains the occurrence of
that phenomenological content. Accordingly, nothing said here should be
taken as in any way tantamount to, or implying, a defense of classical rep-
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resentationalism. For it in no way commits us to the thesis that the referential
or ontological reach of perceptual experience is limited to mental entities
such as 'ideas' or 'sense-data,' Le., that perceptual awareness inevitably
terminates upon something short of material things as such. Rather, the rejection of an untenably crude corpuscular account of perception does not
require that the chunks of matter which constitute the (at least partial) causes
of our veridical perceptual apprehensions are not the direct objects of such
apprehensions. Accordingly, subscribing to some version of direct realism in
no way commits one to the untenable notion that, in the course of veridical
perceptual awareness, the passive intellect-i.e., the purely receptive aspect
of experiential cognition-literally turns into the external material object
an-sich of which the relevant perceiver has direct awareness.
IV
It is time to return to our central concern by way of the question which by
now is virtually clamoring to be answered: namely, what is the significance
of the foregoing epistemological exploration for the thesis that we hope to
secure? How does it bear upon our proposal that traditional theistic metaphysics-notwithstanding its preclusion of literally veridical cases of dsGeallows for a significant sort of ontological union between finite selves and
God? Initially, it might be difficult to see how our epistemological prelude
can be of any serious value to us in this regard. Indeed, one might argue that
it counts strongly against the contention that dsGe can have major metaphysical import. That is, we have focussed on the seemingly incontestable pointas stressed by Aristotle and many other distinguished thinkers-that in the
course of ,experiential cognition, the passive intellect can become (at best)
qualitatively but never numerically identical with the particulars of ordinary
perceptual apprehension.
This notwithstanding, however, we are now positioned to see that our
foregoing epistemological exploration is an indispensable basis for establishing that which is absolutely pivotal for the success or our project. Specifically, it permits us to see that God constitutes a distinct exception to the rule
that limits the passive intellect to (just) qualitative identity with the objects
of experiential cognition. Rather, there is compelling warrant for maintaining
that there can occur veridical perceptual awareness of God l6 in which the
passive intellect of the relevant finite selves would become numerically identical with the object of their veridical perceptual awareness-Le., numerically
identical with God as such. But how so? How can it be that, while the passive
intellect is precluded from becoming numerically identical to material objects
(as such)-in contradistinction to the perceptible form of such objects-it is
not precluded from becoming numerically identical with God?
The answer is this: the all-important difference between the particulars
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apprehended by the external senses and the Particular Who is God, i.e., the
difference that allows for cases of veridical detection of God/God's Presence
in which there occurred numerical (rather than just qualitative) identity between that which constituted the actualization of the passive intellect and
God as such, is that-in contradistinction to all of those things apprehended
via the external senses-God is incorporeal,17 indeed essentially so. Accordingly, God necessarily lacks perceptible form. Consequently, it is transparent
that no case of veridical perceptual detection of God could possibly be such
that the relevant passive intellect was actualized by-had 'as its entire nature'
during the course of the experience in question-God's 'perceptible form.'
This being clear, the proper conclusion would seem to be this: in any case in
which God was veridically experienced nonsuperveniently,i8 that which constituted the actualization of the relevant passive intellect would be nothing
short of God as such. For it is the corporeality of corporeal particulars that
limits the passive intellect to (at best) qualitative identity-in, of course,
cases of veridical perception-with material objects. Alternatively, it is the
corporeality of corporeal particulars that limits the passive intellect to (at
best) numerical identity-in, of course, cases of veridical perception-with
the perceptible form of material objects. Accordingly, it is God's (essential)
incorporeality that ensures the absence of any such limitation.
Now to stress the obvious for just a moment, the passive intellect-as one
aspect of the self-in no way exhausts the self. Clearly, there is considerably
more to the self than passive intellect, just as there is considerably more to
the self than memory, or than imagination: obviously the self (however analyzed) does not reduce to anyone of its aspects. Accordingly, while (if our
argumentation thus far is sound) any veridical case of nonsupervenient experience of God would be such that the 'entire nature' of the relevant passive
intellect would be exhausted by God, the failure of the passive intellect to
exhaust the entire nature of the self ensures that no veridical case of nonsupervenient experience of God would involve God's exhaustion of the self
in its entirety. Alternatively, while passive intellects are thus amenable to
literal absorption by God, this in no way permits the conclusion that finite
selves en toto are amenable to literal absorption by God. Moreover, any such
conclusion could not but spell disaster for our thesis by virtue of violating
the central theistic tenet that there obtains an unbridgeable metaphysical
bifurcation between Creator and creature.
Now it has long been recognized that an important 'pragmatic' test of the
strength or the adequacy of a theory is its explanatory or illuminative power
vis-a-vis the data or phenomena that inspired the theory in the first place.
With regard to our present theory, what we are seeking to illuminate is the
phenomenology of 'absorptive unity,' i.e., to account satisfactorily for the
compelling sensation of 'dissolution-of-self-in God' without in any way com-
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promising the unbridgeable duality between Creator and creature that lies at
the heart of traditional theistic doctrine. Of course, questions of veridicality
aside, it is well-known that persons who undergo such experience tend to be
psychologically certain of its veridicality; indeed, many have spoken of the
'self-authenticating' character of dsGe. Accordingly, notwithstanding what
we have seen to be the decisive warrant for denying that there can occur
literally veridical cases of dsGe, our theory cannot succeed if it fails to
account satisfactorily for the extraordinarily powerful conviction of literal
veridicality that attends experience of this sort.
Hence, we have the following important question to consider: can the compelling sense of 'oneness' with God adequately be explained by what would
be (given the success of our argument thus far) the numerical or ontological
identity that would obtain between God and the passive intellect in any veridical case of nonsupervenient experience of God? Well, perhaps so. After all,
one cannot but suspect that there would be something phenomenologically
overwhelming about having one's passive intellect absorbed by nothing short
of God. Accordingly, while it seems clear that traditional theism precludes the
literal absorption of the entire self by God, it might well be plausible to
maintain that the overpowering conviction of such absorption would amply be
accounted for by the literal merger of the passive intellect with God that would
obtain in any veridical case of nonsupervenient experience of God.
However, it seems clear that we cannot leave it at just that. For if we do,
we can anticipate some legitimate concern as to whether the promise of our
thesis has been fulfilled. Our contention, we recall, was that dsGe can, without in any way compromising the irreducible Creator-creature bifurcation that
is so central to canonical theism, properly be held to mark a significant sort
of ontological union between God and the relevant finite selves, i.e., with the
relevant finite selves in their entirety-not simply with the single aspect of
those selves that constitutes the passive intellect. Our remaining question,
then, becomes the following: granted that any veridical case of nonsupervenient experience of God would be one in which the passive intellect of the
relevant finite self would be literally merged with God, how can we get from
that to the conclusion-given that finite selves in their entirety cannot literally dissolve in God-that the relevant finite self in its entirety would be in
a condition of significant ontological union with God? Exactly what sort of
'union' would this be?
Intriguingly, we will see that in answering this question, considerable
strength will be added to the ability of our theory to explain the intensity of
the conviction of those who undergo such experience that, during the course
of dsGe, the entire self becomes literally unified with God. Consider: it is
misguided to suppose that all metaphysical unification or coming-together
must be absorptive or exhaustive in character, i.e., must be such that one of
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the components involved in the unification loses its distinctive or separate
nature. Rather, there can occur a sort of merger between distinct realities that
can properly be termed conjunctive in the sense that, while a real or ontological linkage occurs, neither of the entities involved surrenders its distinctive
nature. Perhaps the clearest paradigm available to us of such conjunctive
unity is provided by the Cartesian conception of human persons. In the Sixth
Meditation, Descartes states:
Nature ... teaches me ... that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a
vessel, but that I am very closely united to it, and so to speak so intenningled
with it that I seem to compose with it one whole. 19

One need not endorse Descartes' conception of persons-standardly, of
course, called 'mind-body dualism' -in order to appreciate that the sort of
mind-body unification central to that conception, while extraordinarily intimate, is by no means absorptive. Minds and bodies are radically distinct in
nature, and their unification by no means involves a dissolution of either of
these substances into the other. This notwithstanding, however, we are
'lodged' in our bodies much more strongly than is a pilot in his vessel; indeed,
the connection between mind and body (according to the Cartesian account)
is so strong that we do not feel separate or distinct from our bodies. Hence,
while the actual unification of mind with body is strictly conjunctive rather
than absorptive, the phenomenological situation-i.e., what seems to us to be
the case-is that we 'compose with it one whole.'
Here, I suggest, we have the ideal model for understanding the sort of
ontological union that would occur between a finite self (in its entirety) and
God in any case wherein this same finite self had veridical nonsupervenient
experience of God, and, accordingly, wherein there obtained literal or numerical identity between God and the passive intellect of that finite self. Since
there is an undeniably essential connection between the self and all of its
aspects, any case in which some passive intellect was literally exhausted or
absorbed by God would, ipso facto, constitute a case in which it becomes
eminently proper to regard God and the relevant finite self in its entirety as
being in conjunctive (hence nonabsorptive) unity. Moreover, viewing any
such case as one wherein the relevant finite self en toto would be in conjunctive unity with God has the considerable merit of doing full justice to the
compelling phenomenology of absorptive unity without in any way compromising the metaphysical distance between Creator and creature that is nonnegotiably central to classical theism. While theistic metaphysics (and, as we
have seen, conceptual considerations that are independent of theistic doctrine) ensure that finite selves cannot literally dissolve into God, the situation
of conjunctive unity that can properly be held to obtain in any veridical case
of nonsupervenient experience of God permits us to be more sympathetic than
we might otherwise be to the absorptive mystic's conviction that her entire
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self has merged with God to the extent that 'God alone is left.' For in any
such case, the absorptive mystic would be so closely united to God that it
could not but seem to her that she and God composed 'one whole. '20
University of Missouri-Rolla

NOTES
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theistic mystical tradition has long stressed-all such experience constitutes (in the [mal
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humanly achievable. Cf. Thomas Merton, The A.scent to Truth (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., 1951 and 1970), p. 70.
19. The Philosophical Worh of Descartes, translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T.
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